Why value democracy? One familiar answer is that democracy expresses respect for citizens, whereas nondemocratic modes of governance insultingly express disrespect. Recent work has subjected this view to substantial criticism, raising serious doubts about its plausibility. This article contends that prevailing objections succeed only because they target implausible interpretations of this view, according to which the wrong of political exclusion consists in some insulting disregard for the interests of excluded agents. On the revised respect-based argument to be defended here, however, the insult of political exclusion implicates not the interests of excluded agents, but rather their duties. On this view, democracy is uniquely respectful because it recognizes that the work of achieving a just political order is work that morality assigns not simply to a select few, but to all. To shut moral agents out of the decision-making process is insulting because it flouts their status as the kinds of beings on whom duties of justice equally fall, and who therefore have a presumptively equal prerogative to be involved in seeing to it that justice is done. This interpretation of the respect-based argument is not susceptible to the objections advanced against other interpretations. It better accounts for the role of reasonable disagreement about justice in democratic theory. And it is superior at explaining why respect-based democrats should harbor a qualified skepticism toward judicial review: because the job of securing justice fundamentally belongs not to judges, but to everybody.
Introduction
Why should liberals endorse democracy? Why, that is, should those committed to the ideal of liberal justice believe that democracy is the appropriate manner in which to govern their political arrangements? One answer contends that democracy is a valuable mode of decisionmaking because it expresses respect for moral agents, whereas non-democratic modes insultingly express disrespect. But this answer, while initially alluring, is mysterious upon reflection. Why should citizens feel disrespected or insulted if their exclusion from the political process does not leave them or indeed anyone worse off from the standpoint of liberal justice? Especially if liberal justice would be better served by excluding certain people from politics, or by granting them less of an opportunity to influence political decisions than others, what kind of complaint could such persons possibly have?
These questions are persuasively pressed in Niko Kolodny's recent assault on modern democratic theory, which outlines a variety of interpretations of the respect-argument, contending that each fails (2014a). When we consider the reasons why a citizen might take herself to be insulted i when excluded from the political process, none furnish an adequate basis for democracy's value. Consider just three of the potential reasons that Kolodny canvasses:
ii a) Your Substantive Interests Don't Matter: exclusion is disrespectful because it suggests that excluded agents' interests are not to be granted equal weight in the determination of the law. Kolodny rightly notes that none of these alleged insults convincingly grounds the case for democracy. Your Substantive Interests Don't Matter errs because it is perfectly possible to defend a non-democratic form of governance on the basis that excluded agents' interests would be better served by such deviation, as traditional arguments for colonialism held. And while it is surely true that non-democratic arrangements may well be worse at securing liberal justice than democracy is, this is a contingent, not necessary, fact. Insisting that nondemocratic forms of governance necessarily rest on the argument that excluded agents' interests do not matter is thus clearly mistaken.
Similarly, absent further argument, You Will Probably Vote for Injustice fails to supply a good argument for democracy. It is not obviously objectionable to communicate to someone that she is unlikely to support just policies (2015a, p. 219), especially when the judgment is justified. Finally, You Don't Understand Your Own Interests is plainly a nonstarter: those who wish to disenfranchise people on the grounds that they will make bad decisions about justice are not making a judgment about those persons' capacity to pursue their own good successfully. Critics of democracy, then, need not be paternalistic.
Is there anything, then, to be said for the respect-based argument? I believe that Kolodny's objections succeed only because they target implausible versions of the argument.
Once a more attractive alternative is specified, we will see that it less vulnerable to the objections that afflict its cousins. To explain the value of democratic government, I will argue, we need to remember what government is properly for: the achievement of a just society. And it is democracy alone that recognizes that the job of achieving a just society is one that morality assigns not to a select few, but to all. That is why it is uniquely respectful.
In the next section, I offer an initial sketch of this radically different version of the respect-based argument. In the subsequent two sections, I elaborate the argument in order to defend it from some objections. And in the final section, I test-drive the account by showing how it offers plausible guidance on one of the most significant debates in democratic theory:
on the role of judicial review. My aim is to identify and explore a crucial but overlooked pro tanto reason why liberals are rightly attracted to democratic government. While an all-thingsconsidered argument for democracy is beyond the scope of this article, I hope to show that the respect-based argument has greater promise-and merits greater attention-than commonly supposed. How, exactly, does a democratic political order, suitably designed, respect citizens' first moral power? First, it insists that all moral agents be granted a set of democratic rightsof speech, association, and participation-through which to exercise their first moral power.
Respecting citizens as agents of justice
Second, in insists upon a public culture that views political participation not simply as a right to be exercised in order to pursue their own self-interest, but even more importantly a responsibility they owe to others.
x Denying racial minorities and women the franchise was objectionable not simply because it prevented them from advocating for their own interests, xi but more fundamentally, because it signaled that the great challenges of public life were not theirs. Finally, democracy respects all agents' first moral power by insisting upon presumptively equal opportunity for political influence-thereby instantiating the idea that the natural duty of justice binds all as moral equals. 
Refining the respect-based argument
Because the natural duty of justice is at the heart of the account, it gives guidance to the sort of democratic ideal to which we ought to aspire. Here I want to focus on two particular ways it does so. First, it explains why citizens' prerogative to participate in politics is defeasible.
When justice is best served by deviating from democracy, this can, in principle, be justified.
And second, it explains why citizens' prerogative to participate in politics is variably demanding-depending on the costs faced by different agents.
Democracy as defeasible
Suppose that democracy is (at least partly) grounded in respect for citizens' status as agents of justice, as the respect-based argument holds. If that is right, we must not defend the idea that decisions should be made democratically no matter what. Instead we must defend a more plausible idea: that democracy is a default rule-a rule to which we standardly defer provided there is no compelling justification for deviating from it in the case at hand.
If citizens would retard, rather than advance, the achievement of justice by making the decision democratically when there is an alternative mechanism available, they ought to opt for the alternative. And if they view themselves as responsible for advancing justice, as they surely should, they cannot complain of being disrespected when circumstances arise that render this appropriate.
Consider a salient example: national banks. Monetary policy is standardly taken out of the hands of the ordinary democratic process and assigned to a group of experts. The rationale is clear: while such decisions clearly concern the basic structure of society, and so are presumptively the concern of all, they will (the rationale goes) be better made through a process that deviates from the democratic default. Moreover, while the creation and maintenance of national banks has largely been traceable to decisions by democratically elected representatives-the U.S. Federal Reserve System was created by an act of the U.S.
Congress in 1913 and its chairman continues to be appointed by the American president-it is misleading to suggest that individual decisions taken by the Federal Reserve Bank are therefore "made democratically." They are not. Rather, the decisions of monetary policy are deliberately taken outside of democratic hands so that they can be made by those who know better.
Is this inherently objectionable? It surely is if we hold an interpretation of the respectbased argument-like "You Are Likely to Vote for Injustice"-that makes it an insult ever even to suggest that some are unlikely (say, due to lack of knowledge of economics) to make bad decisions. But for a theory grounded in the natural duty of justice, there is nothing inherently objectionable here. It all depends on whether this deviation from the democratic default rule genuinely serves the aims of liberal justice or not.
xii If bearers of the natural duty of justice morally ought to deviate from democracy (specifically, ought to authorize and comply with deviations from democracy) when doing so serves the aims of justice, it is implausible to think that such deviations express disrespect for them. While respect for persons demands that all members of the society have a presumptively equal role in decision-making, they must be prepared to accept a substantially weaker role for those particular decisions that are better made by experts. To deny this would be to fetishize political participation, objectionably, over the achievement of justice.
Hypothetically, deviations from democracy could be justified on a permanent basis. If we had excellent reason to believe that authorizing non-democratic institutions to make political decisions would yield more just outcomes, this would be justified. But it is difficult to accept that the natural duty of justice would license permanent deviations in practice. That is for a wholly uncontroversial reason. All human beings are fallible. It would be morally irresponsible to outsource decisions to others without allowing any opportunity to review those decisions in the future and reconsider them. Accordingly, democratic citizens must view themselves as retaining the prerogative to dispense with outsourcing the moment they judge it to turn against the cause of justice.
The fact of pervasive fallibility also helps explain why deviations from the democratic default should, as a general presumption, be made democratically. Moral emergencies aside, we should favor a standing prohibition on efforts by private individuals to seize the reins of government power by force in order to issue new legal directives, even if those directives are, in fact, wise. No citizen, concerned about the achievement of justice, should tolerate gangsters appointing themselves guardians-even if they avow to be only temporary, and even if they genuinely possess expertise that was likely to enable them to advance the cause of justice. To be sure, history works this way at times, albeit in less dramatic fashion; courts illegitimately arrogate authority to themselves that they were originally not conferred by the democratic polity. xiii But this simply presents citizens with the question of whether they should accept such deviations as ones they already had reason to pursue, or instead work to overturn them.
Democracy as variably demanding
The natural duty of justice also explains why it would be a mistake to expect all moral agents to pursue the exact same courses of action in their activities as citizens. The fact that the natural duty of justice falls on every moral agent-and so applies to all as moral equalsdoes not mean that the specific courses of action it demands are the same for every moral agent. The specific demands of the natural duty of justice are sensitive to the costs it poses on individuals (Rawls 1999, p. 294) . The natural duty of justice is, after all, a duty justified on deontological, rather than consequentialist, grounds; it does not expect agents to sacrifice their most basic interests for others in the way a utilitarian account, for example, would demand. Its requirements must not be unreasonably burdensome.
In a democracy, then, citizens' morally assigned portfolios will be greater or smaller depending on how costly it is for citizens to undertake the work. So while citizens in a democracy are equipped with the same powers of participation-to speak, associate, and vote-different citizens may reasonably be expected to marshal those powers to different degrees, depending on the costs. This is especially so in contexts of serious socioeconomic injustice, in which full-throated democratic participation is costly for some people only because they have been deprived of the resources to which they are morally entitled. It is reasonable to expect greater efforts engaging in political activism, writing op-eds, petitioning public officials, deliberating with co-citizens, and so on, from those for whom such activities are less costly.
It might be suggested that, for certain moral agents, the costs of political participation are so great that it is never reasonable to expect them to engage in any activities aimed at the establishment and maintenance of justice. All that is reasonable to expect of them is simply to comply with just laws, should they happen to exist. xiv Now this could be possible in seriously unjust states, such as totalitarian regimes, in which citizens face considerable threats to life and limb by engaging in any political resistance. However, in the context of modern democratic societies such as the United States and the United Kingdom, it is difficult to believe that there is a determinate group of bona fide moral agents for whom it is unreasonable to expect any efforts to advance justice beyond mere legal compliance. Even if it would be unreasonably costly to expect disadvantaged citizens to dedicate the same resources as their more advantaged compatriots to civic activities, such citizens still have a minimal but vital role to play in the struggle for justice. xv But even if not, it is instructive to note that the kind of crippling disadvantage that would altogether exempt an agent from the labors of democratic politics would be absent in the kind of society toward which the natural duty of justice requires we strive-a society that secured adequate education, opportunity, and resources for all.
It might instead be suggested that even in a just society, some citizens are so fundamentally flawed at reasoning about justice that mere legal compliance is all that could reasonably be expected of them. It is too costly, we might think, to expect them to do the work required of responsible democratic citizenship. Even so, there are powerful reasons to doubt that revoking the democratic rights of such persons would be the right response to this fact. Even if the work of democratic citizenship is so costly for some that it could not reasonably be expected of them at all-something I seriously question-it is implausible that we could bifurcate the population of moral agents into those for whom democratic citizenship is too demanding and those for whom it is not. It is much more plausible to think that it is differentially demanding for different people at different times, depending on their knowledge of the particular issues at stake in a particular election and what else is happening in their lives. When democratic engagement becomes too costly, agents should feel free to refrain from exercising their democratic powers in such instances.
Of course, some citizens do not simply refrain from exercising their democratic powers. Some citizens exercise their democratic powers badly, voting for unjust policies and advocating for unjust causes. Still, so long as it is not too costly to demand of such citizens that they exercise their democratic powers well, we ought to view them as duty-bound to do so. If we accept that an agent has a certain duty, the discovery that the agent is unlikely to live up to that duty does not render him suddenly off the hook. A more familiar response is to insist that he do his duty-remonstrating with him, persuading him, educating him, condemning him-and, in the end, preventing him from doing injustice should our deliberative efforts be unsuccessful. Below I argue that rights-based judicial review, of a certain variety, could serve as such a form of prevention. But to suggest that we could mark out particular people as enduringly fated to vote for injustice-and so strip them of their vote accordingly-is implausible.
More fundamentally, to condemn a bona fide moral agent as hopeless to such an extent as to conclude that he should not even be granted powers of democratic citizenshippronouncing with confidence that he will never live up to his moral duties-effectively amounts to denying that he even possesses the first moral power. If he is a moral agent-if he is the kind of being who can be said to have duties, and to be blamed for failing to discharge them-such denial is seriously disrespectful.
Justifying democratic deviations: the role of disagreement
The disagreement-insensitive respect-based argument
The purpose of a default decision rule is to set the normal mode of decision-making. Only if there is good reason to deviate from the default ought the deviation occur. So we need to know what, exactly, counts as a justification for deviating from democratic decision-making.
In the last section I said that advancing the cause of justice furnishes precisely that justification; a citizen would be betraying her natural duty of justice if she resisted deviation in such a case. This seems straightforwardly to yield the following principle (whose name will become sensible soon enough):
Disagreement-Insensitive Deviation Principle. A deviation from the democratic default rule is justified if it advances the achievement of justice.
The crucial question, then, arises in evaluating what it is to advance the achievement of justice.
Here the argument faces a crossroads. There are, I propose, two different ways in which the respect-based argument could specify when, exactly, deviations are morally permissible. Each, in turn, yields a subtly but importantly different version of our respectbased argument. I will call the first version the disagreement-insensitive respect-based argument; I will call the second version the disagreement-sensitive respect-based argument.
I'll spend the rest of this section sketching out these two versions.
The first path is to follow the aforementioned principle straightforwardly: to argue that when a deviation from democracy will serve the aims of justice, it is justified. A deviation is justifiable just in case it actually advances the cause of justice. The fact that some might disagree with the claim that the deviation advances justice-say, because they hold a This disagreement-insensitive version of the respect-based argument is straightforward and attractive. It is itself a novel position in democratic theory worthy of development. It has especial appeal to those who are dismayed by the considerable focus on disagreement in liberal political theory, believing instead that the phenomenon poses no significant philosophical problems. My own inclination is that reasonable disagreement about justice poses theoretical difficulties for this simple version of the respect-based argumentdifficulties that motivate the specification of a second, more complex variation. Those who disagree can feel free, of course, to embrace the simpler version that this article has, until this point, defended. In the remainder of the article, however, I will develop the more complex, disagreement-sensitive version of the view.
The disagreement-sensitive respect-based argument What would it take for a case for deviation to be beyond reasonable disagreement? First, the policies that the deviation serves to prevent have to be unjust beyond reasonable dispute.
Second, the claim that such injustices would reliably be avoided through the deviation itself also needs to be beyond reasonable dispute.
David Estlund considers this second issue when reflecting on why an "epistocracy of the educated" would be morally impermissible, so it is instructive to see what he has to say.
Estlund's task is to evaluate Mill's proposal to grant extra weight to the votes of (some) university-educated citizens. Estlund argues that it would be reasonable to levy a "demographic objection" against this proposal, according to which "[t]he educated portion of the populace may disproportionately have epistemically damaging features that countervail the admitted epistemic benefits of education" (Estlund 2008, p. 215 collective mission to realize justice. And so they rightly take themselves to be disrespected when they suddenly find themselves excluded from that mission.
The ethics of judicial review
Democracy respects the first moral power of citizens. It recognizes that the job of achieving a just society belongs to all moral agents who are members of that society, in light of their common possession of the natural duty of justice. In this section I apply this argument to one of the most significant ongoing debates in democratic theory: the debate over whether judicial review is morally objectionable. By judicial review, I am referring to rights-based judicial review of democratic legislation: the legal practice according to which "appointed judges have the power to declare enactments of legislatures and other representative institutions void because they offend constitutional guarantees of individual rights" (Dworkin 2006, p. 255) . My limited aim in this section is to show how the respect-based argument helps us better understand a certain familiar complaint about judicial review: that it undemocratically supplants the considered will of the democratic public with the political convictions of judicial elites. Specifically, the respect-based argument shows when this complaint is plausible, when it is implausible, and why. In so doing, it points toward a middle course between the two stark poles that typify the scholarly debate on judicial review.
The most influential argument for judicial review in the scholarly literature is advanced by Ronald Dworkin, who defends the practice on instrumental grounds. On his view, justice is more likely to be achieved in an institutional structure that contains judicial review than in one without it (1996, p. 34) . "The United States," he writes, "is a more just society than it would have been had its constitutional rights been left to the conscience of majoritarian institutions" (1986, p. 356) . xxvii And the reason why judicial review succeeds in advancing the cause of justice is that this is precisely what judges rightly take their job to be. Many liberals balked at this decision because they hold that freedom of speech, properly interpreted, is consistent with campaign finance regulation. But this is not the reason why we ought to criticize such a case. If the case was wrongly decided, it is because there is
reasonable disagreement about what free speech demands, permits, or prohibits in the matter of campaign finance. In the face of such reasonable disagreement, the right response is to settle the matter democratically-as citizens indeed did when they democratically enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). It is not the proper job of judges to supplant a reasonable, democratically enacted account of the right to free speech with their own reasonable account.
This rejection of the Dworkinian position retains the spirit of Waldron's criticism, but it differs in three interrelated ways. First, it agrees with Waldron that Dworkin fails to take disagreement seriously, but it emphasizes that the real problem is a failure to take reasonable disagreement seriously, not simply disagreement simpliciter. xxix Waldron is liable to the charge of equivocation on this point, especially in his earlier writings on this subject.
"Legislation deserves respect," Waldron writes, "because of the achievement it represents in the circumstances of politics: action-in-concert in the face of disagreement" (1999, p. 108).
Judicial review, he thinks, objectionably short-circuits that democratic achievement. But this argument goes too far. Democratic law-making is not an achievement in all cases. It is only an achievement when the policy enacted is from the set of morally reasonable candidate policies. We should not celebrate any proposed solution to our disagreements over public policy, no matter how morally bankrupt. Provided such a proposal can pass the tests for outsourcing specified earlier, citizens have strong moral reason to endorse it.
Finally, the respect-based argument offers a more direct and, I submit, more convincing non-consequentialist story about why judicial elites should not mettle in the reasonable political disagreements of ordinary citizens: it's not their job. xxxii Rather, it's everyone's job. The task of specifying the demands of justice through law is one that belongs, in the first instance, to all. The sense of outrage citizens routinely experience when reasonable legislation is enacted by the democratic assembly, and then dissolved by the courts, testifies to this core conviction. And the respect-based argument I have defended accounts for why that conviction is justified.
Now it does not follow that we should entrust courts to strike down any and all legislation that falls beyond the pale of reasonable dispute. Three observations are important to make here. First, familiar concerns about the rule of law recommend our present practice, whereby certain fundamental rights are specified in a constitutional text that then anchors jurists' deliberations. Here the idea of reasonable disagreement enters the story in two ways.
On this account, the rights protected by a constitution should include only those that no one could reasonably deny; rights whose existence (or, if you prefer, justification) is subject to reasonable disagreement are properly left to the ordinary democratic process to recognise or deny. xxxiii Further, in a system so conceived, judges should only strike down legislation when it is beyond reasonable disagreement that the legislation actually violates the right in question.
Second, the fact that a given right is beyond reasonable dispute is necessary but not sufficient for its inclusion on the list of rights to receive judicial protection. The argument for the Disagreement-Sensitive Deviation Principle we specified earlier held that a given instance of outsourcing is justified only when it is beyond reasonable disagreement that the outsourcing will advance justice. But using judicial review may be a poor candidate for advancing justice in certain areas. For example, suppose that it is beyond reasonable disagreement that the state provide welfare benefits for socially deprived citizens. Even so, many suppose that judicial involvement in the provision of welfare rights is counterproductive (Brettschneider 2007, p. 148; Tushnet 2004) , failing to advance the protection of these rights. If that is so, then clearly our natural duty of justice should not move us to specify welfare rights as among those the judiciary should be tasked with protecting. So, it goes, too, for legislation predicated on, say, manifestly unreliable economic data. Even if it undeniably unjust, it does not follow that courts should be empowered to strike it down, given the lack of economic expertise of jurists.
Third, a policy could be beyond the pale of reasonable disagreement and yet only constitute a trivial or mild injustice. Suppose that a new democratically enacted regulation requires restaurants to list their dishes on their menus in rough order of those dishes' popularity, and that this is a manifestly silly regulation. I hazard that it would strike most as intuitive that such legislation, however foolish, should not be struck down by a court. The appropriate remedy in such a situation would be for democratic citizens to reconsider the statute and alter it accordingly. But why? Why not simply accept that courts ought to be empowered to strike them down? This possibility is not, strictly speaking, precluded by the argument here. But there are reasons to suppose that judicial review ought to be restricted not simply to striking down injustices, but injustices of a sufficient seriousness. These reasons concern the costs of permitting the judiciary to strike down trivially unjust legislation. In part, these costs consist in worries about clogging court dockets with complaints against policies that, while wrongful, are best resolved by pressuring the legislature to revisit the issue and alter its stance. But the costs may run even deeper. Given that democracies are likely to make trivial albeit undeniable mistakes from time to time, constant interference by the courts may have a deleterious affect on the democratic process. Some scope for making mistakes is indispensable, we might think, for a democracy staffed by fallible citizens. xxxiv Some latitude to make mistakes might well be necessary for the democratic process to function effectively with respect to its central aim: advancing just government.
In principle, we ought to be open to all of these concerns; I bring them up here simply to note that a complete account of judicial review would need to attend to them. But notice:
these concerns are instrumental, centrally concerned with the advancement of substantive justice. They do not rely on the thought that the democratic decision, albeit undeniably unjust, has intrinsic value in virtue of its majoritarian credentials. Registering an insight that I suspect is widely shared, Corey Supreme Court 1951). The suggestion has had its defenders in political philosophy, too.
Thomas Christiano argues that only "core" exercises of individual rights should be judicially protected, leaving peripheral cases for democratic decision-making (Christiano 2008, pp. 136ff ). Laura Valentini similarly distinguishes between concerns of "fundamental justice," which ought to be constitutionally protected, and non-fundamental concerns that ought to be left to democratic citizens to decide (2013, pp. 180-181 iii "The peculiar insult to an individual, A, of A's being excluded from political power," Jeremy Waldron writes, "has to do, first, with the impact of political decisions on A's own rights and interests" (1999, p. 238). As Kolodny notes, this view is also advanced by Beitz 1989, p. 110, and Dworkin 2002, p. 200. iv The suggestion that political exclusion communicates to agents that their capacity for moral reasoning is inferior is widespread; for just some examples, offered by Kolodny, see Dworkin 1996, p. 28; Waldron 1999, pp. 239-39; Christiano 2010, p. 93; and Richardson 2002, pp. 62-3. v This duty is discussed in Rawls 1999, pp. 99-100, 115, 293-301, and 334, as xvii This is not to suggest that the value of such structures is only instrumental. As Eric Beerbohm notes, "The distinction between intrinsic and instrumental goods does not cut at the joint of value" (2008, p. 34). We can value democracy noninstrumentally without believing that democratic procedures contain intrinsic value, no matter how they are used. Beerbohm contends that democracy is noninstrumentally valuable because of "the relationships among cocitizens that honoring its rules makes possible" (p. 36). What makes these relationships valuable? Beerbohm's answer is "the root contractualist idea that we care about standing in relations of recognition or coanswerability with each other" (pp. 38-39). In place of this claim, I have argued for the simpler claim that democracy is valuable because it enables agents to live up to their moral duties. This is a distinct argument than Beerbohm's argument based on "relations of recognition or co-answerability", which does not explicitly invoke the natural duty of justice; but it is certainly in the same family of approaches to democracy's value. xviii Unfortunately for Rawls, his account of the burdens of judgment gives support for both the subjectivist and the objectivist accounts of reasonable disagreement (Rawls, . But the slavery example shows that the subjectivist account cannot be right. xix Though this fact may bear on the appropriate degree of blame or punishment she deserves. xx In his definitive treatment of objectively reasonable disagreement, Christopher McMahon writes: "[T]he position taken by a party to a disagreement is reasonable if and only if it is or could be the product of competent reasoning." He continues: "Reasoning is competent when it is carried out in awareness of all the relevant considerations, the cognitive capacities exercised in extracting conclusions from the relevant considerations are appropriate, and these capacities are functioning properly" (2009, p. 8 Enoch (2006, pp. 23-25) . xxx It is important to recognize that, in more recent work, Waldron has qualified his argument. He advances a set of assumptions that must hold in order for his rejection of judicial review to succeed. Notable among these assumptions is the existence of a widespread "commitment to rights" among citizens of the democratic polity (2006, p. 1364) . But he never specifies this to mean "committed to reasonable views about rights." A society in which opposing parties cast their arguments in the language of rights seems to satisfy Waldron's assumptioneven though plenty of flagrantly unreasonable political positions can be described using rights-talk (such as when citizens justify banning gay marriage on grounds of religious freedom, or justify slavery with the language of property rights 
